Electronically Filed
8/13/2018 11:04 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID KIRT HOSKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 45670
Bannock County Case No.
CR-2015-14475

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Hoskins failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
relinquishing jurisdiction, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his unified sentence
of three years, with one year fixed, imposed following his guilty plea to felony injury to a jail or
other place of confinement?

Hoskins Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Officers arrested Hoskins for possession of drug paraphernalia after they observed him
holding a “glass smoking pipe” in his hand. (R., p.29.) Officers subsequently executed a search
warrant on Hoskins’ residence and found “more drug paraphernalia” and a wallet containing
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Hoskins’ identification card, two plastic bindles of “a white crystalline substance” that tested
presumptive positive for methamphetamine, “a blue ‘tooter,’” “a spoon fashioned out of a nail,
and several scraping devices.” (R., p.30.)
While officers were transporting Hoskins to the Bannock County Jail:
… [Hoskins] began to complain of back pain and kick the passenger side rear
door of the patrol vehicle. Officers advised [Hoskins] if he continued his
behavior and damaged property he would be charged for the damages; however,
he continued to kick the door.
[Hoskins] stated he had an injured back, and was advised they would get
him to the jail as quickly as possible to have him checked out by the nursing staff.
He continued to kick the door with great force, enough to break things, as well as
the back window and the bars of the cage. [Hoskins] smeared his boots all over
the back seat area, and was screaming and yelling saying he was going to have the
officers [sic] job.
As they were about 2 minutes away from the jail [Hoskins] requested
Emergency Medical Services, and the officers told him it would be faster for him
to receive medical help by driving to the jail rather than park and wait while in the
patrol vehicle for EMS to respond ….
(PSI, p.5. 1) Once at the jail, a Pocatello Fire Department Ambulance responded to assess
Hoskins, after which “medical staff” advised that “they did not believe [Hoskins] needed to go to
the hospital.” (PSI, p.5.) Hoskins was nevertheless transported to the hospital at the request of
jail nursing staff, where he was “x-rayed and tested for injuries”; once again, hospital staff
“advised officers they did not locate any injuries” and determined that Hoskins “could be turned
over to the Bannock County Jail without specific discharge instruction for nursing staff.” (PSI,
pp.5-6.)
Officers later checked their patrol vehicle and found that, as a result of Hoskins’ kicking
the inside of the vehicle, “the metal bars that protect the windows of the passenger door were
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “CONFIDENTIAL
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS HOSKINS 45670.pdf.”
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bent in the middle.” (PSI, p.6.) Officers reported that Hoskins had also damaged the passenger
door itself, noting that the “top side of the door was ajar and even when the door was closed and
locked, the top of the door did not seal as the hinges of the door were bent out of place.” (PSI,
p.6.)
The state charged Hoskins with possession of methamphetamine and felony injury to a
jail or other place of confinement, with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.54-57.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hoskins pled guilty to felony injury to a jail or other place of
confinement, and the state dismissed the remaining charge and the enhancement. (R., pp.10810.) Hoskins was released on his own recognizance pending sentencing; however, he failed to
ever report to Court Services or for drug and alcohol testing as required, and he also later failed
to appear for his sentencing hearing. (R., pp.109, 111, 113.) The district court issued a warrant
for Hoskins’ arrest on April 30, 2016, and Hoskins was arrested approximately four months later,
on August 17, 2016.

(R., pp.113-15.)

He subsequently refused to cooperate with the

presentence process and his sentencing hearing was again delayed, until November 28, 2016.
(R., pp.119, 130; PSI, p.82.) At the November 28, 2016 sentencing hearing, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, suspended the sentence, and
placed Hoskins on supervised probation for two years. (R., pp.136-43.)
Two months later, Hoskins’ probation officer filed a progress report, advising the court
that Hoskins had failed to ever check in with the probation office and his whereabouts were
unknown. (R., p.146.) The district court again issued a warrant for Hoskins’ arrest, and Hoskins
was taken into custody on February 7, 2017. (R., p.147.) Hoskins was released from the county
jail one week later, with the requirement that he immediately check in with his probation officer.
(R., p.151.) Upon doing so, Hoskins provided a false address and tested positive for marijuana
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and methamphetamine.

(R., pp.151-53.)

Thereafter, he failed to ever again report for

supervision; this time, Hoskins was at large and unsupervised for approximately five months
before he was located and taken into custody. (R., pp.152, 155.) Hoskins’ probation officer filed
a report of violation and Hoskins subsequently admitted that he violated the terms of his
probation by absconding supervision and testing positive for marijuana and methamphetamine,
and, on July 24, 2017, the district court revoked Hoskins’ probation, executed the underlying
sentence, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.152-53, 159-64.)
On August 17, 2017, despite the fact that he was already represented by counsel, Hoskins
filed a pro se Rule 35 motion and a motion for appointment of counsel. (R., pp.167-70, 182-85.)
Hoskins’ counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw, which the district court granted, and
new counsel was appointed. (R., pp.186-87, 198-202.) On November 15, 2017, after receiving
an APSI report from the Department of Correction recommending relinquishment, the district
court relinquished jurisdiction.

(R., pp.211-12; PSI, pp.57-62.)

Hoskins’ new counsel

subsequently filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence and, following a hearing on the
motion, the district court denied Hoskins’ Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.213-18.) Hoskins filed a
notice of appeal timely from both the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction and from the
district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.219-23.)
Hoskins asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction in
light of his difficult childhood, mental and physical issues, and because, he claims, the instant
offense was not serious, and he “should have been afforded more time and staff energy” while on
his rider. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-8.) Hoskins has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4). The
decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the
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defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned
on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889, 303 P.3d 241,
248 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v.
Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205–06, 786 P.2d 594, 596–97 (Ct. App. 1990)). A court's decision to
relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under
I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013); Hansen, 154
Idaho at 889, 303 P.3d at 248 (citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292
(2001)).
Hoskins is not an appropriate candidate for community supervision in light of his
ongoing substance abuse and criminal conduct, his complete disregard for the terms of
community supervision and repeated absconding behavior, his poor attitude and resistance to
programming while on his rider, his failure to demonstrate any rehabilitative progress, and his
high risk to reoffend. Hoskins, now 48 years old, has a history of criminal offending that spans
more than three decades – he was first “convicted of burglary” at age 12. (PSI, pp.3, 7-15.) His
criminal record includes convictions for rape, battery, felony injury to a child, violation of a
domestic violence protection order, two convictions for disorderly conduct (both of which were
amended from domestic battery), two convictions for burglary, three convictions for petit theft,
possession of methamphetamine, disturbing the peace, beer consumption under age, providing
false information to police, DUI, three convictions for failure to purchase a driver’s license, four
convictions for DWP, and the instant offense of felony injury to a jail or other place of
confinement. (PSI, pp.7-15.) Hoskins’ claim that his conduct in the instant offense “was not
violent” and he “may have been justified, to some extent, in acting out in the patrol car in order
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to gain the officer’s attention, due to his level of pain” (Appellant’s brief, p.7) is contradicted by
the record, which shows that officers immediately responded both to Hoskins’ violent kicking
and to his verbal complaints, informing him that he would be charged for the damages “if he
continued his behavior and damaged property” (PSI, p.5) and that they “would get him to the jail
as quickly as possible to have him checked out by the nursing staff” (PSI, p.5). Hoskins
nevertheless persisted in his violent behavior – he “continued to kick the door with great force,
enough to break things, as well as the back window and the bars of the cage.” (PSI, pp.5-6.)
Hoskins’ conduct while in the patrol car was not in any way justified, as he carried on with his
violent actions despite the fact that he undoubtedly had the officers’ attention and their
assurances that they would access medical care for him as soon as possible. (PSI, pp.5-6.)
Hoskins’ behavior while in the patrol vehicle was also unquestionably violent, as evinced by the
fact that he bent the metal bars that protect the windows and also bent the hinges on the
passenger door out of place.

(PSI, pp.5-6.)

Contrary to Hoskins’ claim, the violent and

unjustified nature of the offense does not support a probation disposition in this case.
Hoskins has previously been granted numerous opportunities on probation; however, he
displayed a disdain for the terms of supervision, consistently violating the conditions of
probation by committing new crimes, abusing illegal drugs, and absconding supervision. (PSI,
pp.7, 10, 15-16.) His behavior in this case was no different – he committed the new crime of
providing false information to police while this case was pending, used marijuana and
methamphetamine while he was on probation, absconded three separate times, and was
unsupervised the entire time that he was in the community. (R., pp.111-15, 146-48, 152-56.)
Hoskins’ indifference toward rules was also evident during his prior stints in prison, as he
“received multiple disciplinary reports for fighting, disrespect to staff, being in unauthorized
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areas, several verbal attitude problems, refusal to report for work or meetings with case
managers, manipulation, and possession of tobacco.” (PSI, p.15.)
Unsurprisingly, Hoskins’ disregard for institutional rules continued during his period of
retained jurisdiction in this case; staff at NICI reported that Hoskins displayed a bad attitude and
a resistance to programming from the outset of his rider. (PSI, pp.76-77.) Hoskins “came off
aggressive and pissed off toward staff during his arrival processing intake,” and, when he met
with a clinician for his mental health intake screening, he refused to answer questions about his
mental health issues and “demanded that he be returned to ‘the yard,’” insisting that NICI staff
“could not treat his mental health or medical issues” and stating that he “requires pain
medication ‘norcos’ that [NICI staff] won’t prescribe him.” (PSI, pp.76-77.) Although Hoskins
“eventually agreed to stay at NICI, meet with medical and mental health staff to address his
issues, and participate in his Rider programming,” the very next day he again told NICI staff that
“he felt he shouldn’t be here at NICI due to his mental health and medical conditions.” (PSI,
pp.77-78.)
Hoskins’ poor attitude and resistance to programming continued throughout his stay at
NICI, as he frequently complained about being required to participate in programs and
repeatedly stated that he “should just go do his time.” (PSI, pp.64-66, 71, 74-77.) He incurred
disciplinary sanctions throughout his three-month rider – including four verbal warnings, four
written warnings, and one DOR – with the majority of them occurring during his last month in
the program. (PSI, p.59.) NICI staff reported that Hoskins “demonstrated his knowledge of
knowing what the rules are and how to follow them when he chose to,” but that he showed “an
attitude that the rules are there and others should follow them and he will do what he wants” and
that “he does not need to change as everyone else is the problem not him.” (PSI, pp.59-61.)
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On appeal, Hoskins claims that he “should have been afforded more time and staff
energy” while on his rider due to his cognitive deficits and mental health issues. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.6-7.) It should be noted, however, that Hoskins has previously completed the rider
program successfully; as such, he has already demonstrated that he has the capacity to do so.
(PSI, p.15.)

Furthermore, the record shows that Hoskins received a recommendation for

relinquishment due to his own lack of effort and resistance to programming, as staff at NICI
consistently worked with him and provided accommodations as needed. Although Hoskins
argues that “[t]he PSI and APSI failed to incorporate any outside medical records, counseling
records, or recent cognitive testing” to “indicate the appropriate type of programming needed” on
his rider (Appellant’s brief, p.5), information with respect to Hoskins’ physical and mental issues
was contained in the PSI, which included a mental health report that was completed for
sentencing in this case (PSI, pp.6-7, 17, 21-23, 48). Moreover, before Hoskins began his rider
programming in this case, he was sent to the Department of Correction’s Reception and
Diagnostic Unit for evaluation, where he received a physical examination, a psychological
evaluation, an educational assessment, and a substance abuse evaluation – for the purpose of
determining his programming needs and appropriate placement.

(PSI, p.78; see

https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/inmate_classification (Appendix A).) Further, there
are several notations in the APSI indicating that Hoskins was capable of completing his assigned
programming, that he demonstrated the ability to “do[ ] well in group” and to “ask[ ] for help”
when needed, and that staff informed him of their willingness to make modifications to his
programs if necessary. (PSI, pp.71, 73-74, 77.) As such, it is clear that Hoskins’ programming
needs were evaluated before he was placed in his assigned rider programs, that he demonstrated
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an ability to complete the programs while on his rider, and that – if the programs proved too
difficult for him – program staff would modify the programs as needed.
Contrary to Hoskins’ claim that “[t]here is no indication in the APSI that any classes
were actually modified for him,” the APSI indicates that NICI staff consistently offered to help
Hoskins, assured him that they were willing to work with him and to provide modifications as
needed, and advised him that their expectation was merely that he put forth effort and learn
“within the scope that he is able to achieve.” (PSI, pp.59-60, 64-66, 68, 71, 73-74, 77.) Staff
provided Hoskins with special accommodations for his medical conditions, and, in his
programming, he was provided with an individual tutor; his CBI-SA facilitator modified the
class requirements by allowing him to use his notes to remember what he was taught; and he was
placed in a literacy class, where he was allowed to work “independently with a student aide in a
separate room from the regular class,” he was provided with help to “complete any assignments
for his groups,” and he was also given time to “do his coloring to relax him.” (PSI, pp.64-66, 68,
71, 77.) Despite this, Hoskins “made very little effort” to complete his programming, instead
focusing on “how he could not do the work and that nobody helped him.” (PSI, p.61.) Program
staff reported that when he was offered help, Hoskins refused it, and that his “strategy was to
focus on how he could not do the program due to his disability and [he] was not even willing to
try.” (PSI, p.60.)
Ultimately, Hoskins failed to complete any of his rider programming, and NICI reported
that his risk to reoffend is “High.” (PSI, p.58.) NICI recommended that the district court
relinquish jurisdiction, stating, “Hoskins did not show any desire to change” and:
As long as Mr. Hoskins views the rest of the world is [sic] the problem, he
will be unable to move toward change. He displayed the behavior that he was
entrenched in his criminal thinking and behavior and was not willing to move
away from this. Mr. Hoskins was not willing to acknowledge or correct his
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negative behavior when the staff would bring it to his awareness, instead Mr.
Hoskins would become defensive and disrespectful to staff. Mr. Hoskins
continually displayed the attitude that he was going to do what he wants with no
regard to the rules at NICI. At this time, Mr. Hoskins is not a suitable candidate
for probation.
(PSI, p.61.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably determined
that Hoskins was no longer a suitable candidate for probation. The court’s decision to relinquish
jurisdiction was appropriate in light of Hoskins’ ongoing disregard for the law and the terms of
community supervision, his continued substance abuse and repeated absconding behavior while
on probation in this case, his poor attitude and resistance to programming while on his rider, his
failure to demonstrate any rehabilitative progress, and his high risk to reoffend. Given any
reasonable view of the facts, Hoskins has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.
Hoskins next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence in light of his “volunteer efforts while at IDOC,” reiteration
that he suffered injuries in 2005 that still cause him difficulties, and suggestions for his
placement on probation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.) If a sentence is within applicable statutory
limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court
reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201,
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Hoskins must “show that the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Hoskins has failed to satisfy his burden.
Hoskins provided no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.213-16;
PSI, pp.129-32.) Information with respect to Hoskins’ volunteer efforts while in the custody of
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the Department of Correction, the difficulties he has as a result of his 2005 back injury and
concussion, and various suggestions for his placement on probation was before the district court
at the time that it relinquished jurisdiction and, therefore, was not “new” information. (PSI, pp.6,
22, 26, 49, 67, 69-71, 74-77, 105-09, 114-15, 133-36, 140-41.) Because Hoskins presented no
new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his
sentence was excessive. Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any
basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order relinquishing
jurisdiction and the district court’s order denying Hoskins’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence.

DATED this 13th day of August, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of August, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A
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Inmate Classification

Inmate Classification
Inmate Classification
Offenders committed to the custody of the Department are sent to

a Reception and Diagnostic Unit (RDU)

for evaluation and classification .
During the RDU process, the offender will receive a physical examination, a psychological evaluation, an
educational assessment, and a substance abuse evaluation.
Most offenders will be assigned a custody level based on the following (civil commitments and offenders
under the sentence of death are not classified):
•
•
•
•
•

Current crime;
Criminal history;
Escape history;
Age;
Institutional behavior;

•
•
•
•

Proximity to release;
Detainers and warrants;
Placement matrix;
Risk posed to the public, staff, and other offenders; and

• Programming needs.
The classification types are listed on the buttons.

https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/print/content/prisons/inmate_ classification
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